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Communitarianism and Republicanism 
RICHARD 
Communitarianism and republicanism are closely 
related schools of thought - so closely related that 
friend and foe alike sometimes conflate them. The 
relationship is evident in their Latin roots: commu-
nitarians are concerned with communitas, the com-
mon life of people who form a community, and 
republicans are devoted to the res publica, the good 
of the public. Of the two, however, only republi-
canism traces its lineage as well as its name to 
ancient Rome. Indeed, scholars often look beyond 
Rome to the philosophers and city-states of ancient 
Greece, particularly Aristotle and Sparta, for the 
origins of republicanism. For the origins of com-
munitarianism, though, one need look no farther 
back than the nineteenth century, and it is only since 
the 1980s that the term 'communitarian' has gained 
its present currency as a result of the so-called 
liberal-communitarian debate. 
This debate points to another way in which com-
munitarianism and republicanism are related. Both 
the emergence of communitarianism and the revival 
ofrepublicanism in recent years stem from an uneasi-
ness with liberalism. In both cases the fundamental 
complaint is that liberalism is guilty of an excessive 
or misguided emphasis on the rights and liberties of 
the individual that 'nurtures a socially corrosive form 
of individualism' (Newman, 1989: 254). But exactly 
how liberalism has gone wrong and what should be 
done to set matters right are points on which commu-
nitarians and republicans disagree - not only with 
each other but among themselves. Some communitar-
ians and republicans advance their theories as alter-
natives to liberalism, while others take themselves to 
be restoring or reviving the concern for community or 
civic life that once informed liberal theory and prac-
tice. For contemporary communitarians and republi-
cans alike, then, the abiding challenge is to define 
their position in relation to liberalism. 
DAGGER 
This challenge is especially daunting for 
communitarians, who seem to be joined more by a 
common impulse or longing than by agreement on 
shared principles. As a result, as I shall explain 
below, communitarians have been vulnerable to 
three charges: first, that their objections to liberal 
theory are largely misconceived; second, that they 
have no clear alternative to offer, largely because 
they fail to define 'community' in a precise or use-
ful way; and third, that the vague alternative they do 
offer runs the risk of imposing stifling conformity, 
or worse, on society. There is, in addition, the 
embarrassment that some of the most prominent 
scholars to wear the communitarian label have 
either abandoned communitarianism or denied that 
the label ever truly fitted them. 
Contemporary republicans face similar charges, 
but they have more resources with which to meet 
them. To understand what these resources arc, 
however, and to appreciate the superiority of republi-
canism to communitarianism, we shall need to begin 
at the beginning - before the liberal-communitarian 
debate and before the republican revival of the last 
30 years or so - with a brief account of the republi-
can tradition in the history of political thought. 
With that and an even briefer account of the devel-
opment of communitarianism lending the necessary 
background, we shall be in a position to assess the 
merits and prospects of contemporary communitar-
ianism and republicanism. 
REPUBLICANISM, CLASSICAL 
AND MODERN 
According to the standard dictionary definition, a 
republic is a political system with a representative 
168 Handbook of Political Theory 
government and an elected executive officer rather 
than a monarch. In places where the presence or 
vestiges of monarchy are not a concern, the stress is 
likely to fall on the representative aspect of republi-
canism, as it did when James Madison distin-
guished a 'republic' from a 'pure democracy' in 
Federalist 10 (Rossiter, 1961: 81-2). Where the 
real or symbolic power of monarchy is still a polit-
ical force, the anti-monarchical aspect of republi-
canism will be primary - as the statements of the 
Austrahan Republican Movement and similar 
groups m other Commonwealth countries indicate. 1 
The same is true of France and other countries in 
which the struggle between pro- and anti-monarchical 
forces became a defining feature of the political 
culture. 2 Setting these differences of emphasis 
aside, however, it seems safe to say that a republi-
can is someone who favours representative govern-
ment and opposes hereditary monarchy. 
Safe, perhaps, but neither entirely accurate nor 
especially enlightening. Whether they were Greeks 
or Romans, the original republicans did not think of 
the republic as a form of representative government. 
The ideal, at least, was that the republic would be a 
form of self-government in which citizens would act 
and speak for themselves. Historically, moreover, 
republicans have been concerned less with the elimi-
nation of monarchy than with preventing the abuse 
of power by anyone holding public office. Cicero 
docs ask in his Republic, 'So who would call that a 
republic, i.e., the property of the public, when every-
one was oppressed by the cruelty of a single man?' 
(1998: 72 [Book III, 43]). But the subsequent dis-
cussion reveals that Cicero believed that rule by the 
few and rule by the many could also be tyrannical -
and therefore not republican. Like Polybius, 
Aristotle, and Plato, he held that there are both just 
and tyrannical forms of rule by one, by the few, and 
by the many, and he agreed with Polybius when he 
insisted that the surest way to prevent tyranny is 
through 'a carefully proportioned mixture' (1998: 21 
[Book I, 45]) of these forms of rule. If Cicero and 
other republicans have often opposed monarchy, it is 
because hereditary monarchs tend to regard the state 
or body politic as their property, to be disposed of as 
they wish, rather than as the res publica - the 
public's property or affair. The core of republican-
ism, in short, is neither a desire for representation 
nor opposition to monarchy as such; it is the belief 
that government is a public matter to be directed by 
the members of the public themselves.' 
This is to say that publicity and self government 
are the cornerstones of republicanism. By 'public-
ity' I mean the condition of being open and public 
rather than private or personal. This is the sense in 
which John Stuart Mill uses the word when he 
argues in Considerations on Representative 
Government that the vote is not a right to be exercised 
in secret but a trust or duty that 'should be performed 
under the eye and criticism of the public' ( 1991: 
355). But what, then, is 'the public'? And how are 
its members to govern themselves? There is no single 
republican answer to these questions. Republicans 
long assumed that only citizens counted as 
members of the public and only property-owning, 
arms-bearing men could be citizens. Contemporary 
republicans define the public and citizenship more 
expansively, however, to include women and 
people without substantial property. Similar shifts 
have occurred with regard to self-government. 
When they designed representative institutions for 
the new republic, for example, the men who drafted 
the US Constitution knew they were departing from the 
classical conception of self-government as direct 
participation in rule; yet they saw representation as 
an improvement within, not an abandonment of, 
republican practice. Whether they were right to 
think so, or whether they sacrificed too much 
participation and relied too heavily on representa-
tion, remains a point of contention. But it is the 
commitment to publicity and self-government that 
generates this and other intramural disputes among 
republicans. For republicans, the question is not 
whether publicity and self-government arc good 
things, but how best to achieve them. 
One could say the same, of course, about liberals, 
conservatives, socialists, and others who claim to 
promote government of, by, and for the people. To 
the extent that they stress the importance of public-
ity and self-government, however, modem political 
theories draw upon the legacy of classical republi-
canism. To the extent that they differ from one 
another - and from republicanism - it is because 
they pursue the implications of publicity and self-
government in different ways. To understand what 
is distinctive about republicanism, then, we must 
examine the implications republicans draw from 
publicity and self-government. 
In the case of publicity, the implications are 
twofold. The first is that politics, as the public's 
business, must be conducted openly, in public. The 
second is that 'the public' is more than a group of 
people; it is an aspect or sphere of life with its own 
claims and considerations, even if it is not easily 
distinguished from the private. Something is public 
when it involves people who share common con-
cerns that take them out of their private lives and 
beyond: as Tocqueville put it in Democracy in 
America, 'the circle of family and friends' (1969: 
506). No matter how desirable they may seem to 
others, neither a life of unfettered self-indulgence 
nor one devoted exclusively to family and friends 
will appeal to a republican. 
From these aspects of publicity follow the 
republican emphases on the rule of law and, perhaps 
most distinctively, civic virtue. The public business 
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must be conducted in public not only for reasons of 
convenience - literally, of coming together - but 
also to guard against corruption. As citizens, people 
must be prepared to overcome their personal incli-
nations and set aside their private interests when 
necessary to do what is best for the public as a 
whole. The public-spirited citizens who act in this 
way display public or civic virtue. If they are to 
manifest this virtue, furthermore, the public must be 
bound by the rule of law. Because it is the public's 
business, politics requires public debate and deci-
sions, which in tum require rules establishing who 
may speak, when they may speak, and how deci-
sions are to be reached. Decisions must then take 
the form of promulgated rules or decrees that guide the 
conduct of the members of the public. From 
the insistence on publicity, the rule of law quickly 
follows. 4 
The connection of self-government to the rule 
of law is at least as strong and immediate. Self-
goveming citizens cannot be subject to absolute or 
arbitrary rule, whether it proceeds from external or 
internal forces. If the citizen is to be self-governing, 
that is, he or she must be free from the absolute or 
arbitrary rule of others, which means that citizens 
must be subject to the rule of law - the government 
or empire of laws, not of men, according to the old 
formula. 5 Moreover, self-government requires self-
governing. The republican citizen is someone who 
acts not arbitrarily, impulsively, or recklessly, but 
according to laws he or she has a voice in making. 
'For the impulse of appetite alone is slavery', as 
Rousseau declared in the Social Contract (1978: 56 
[Book I, ch. 8]), 'and obedience to the law one has 
prescribed for oneself is freedom'." Again, the need 
for the rule of law is evident. 
As with publicity, the republican commitment to 
self-government leads to characteristic republican 
themes, such as concern for freedom, equality, and, 
again, civic virtue. Self-government is, of course, a 
form of freedom. For republicans, it is the most 
important form, for other kinds of individual free-
dom are secure only in a free state, under law. 
Freedom thus requires dependence upon the law so 
that citizens may be independent of the arbitrary 
will of others. As Rousseau said in Emile: 
Dependence on men ... engenders al\ the vices, and by 
it, master and slave are mutually corrupted. If there is 
any means of remedying this ill in society, it is to sub-
stitute law for man and to arm the general wills with a 
real strength superior to the action of every particular 
will. (1979: 85) 
Rousseau also knew, as he makes plain in the 
Discourse on the Origin of lnequalitr and Political 
Economy, that the law itself could be corrupted. 
That is why he ends Book I of the Social Cont met 
with this note: 'laws are always useful to those\\ ho 
have possessions and harmful to those who have 
nothing. It follows from this that the social state is 
only advantageous to men insofar as they all have 
something and none of them has anything superflu-
ous' (1978: 58). Equality under law is only possi-
ble, in other words, when wealth and property arc 
distributed in a way that prevents some people from 
bending the law to their will. Republicans, includ-
ing Rousseau, have typically endorsed private own-
ership of property because they sec in it a means of 
fostering independence. They have been less inter-
ested in an equal opportunity to become rich, how-
ever, than in equal protection under the law and 
equal opportunities to participate in public life. 
That is why they have sometimes called for limits 
on the accumulation of wealth, as James Harrington 
did in Oceana when he advocated an 'agrarian' law 
'fixing the balance in lands' (1992: 13). (For simi-
lar views in contemporary republicanism, sec 
Sandel, 1996: 329-33 and Pettit, 1997: 135.) It also 
explains Mary Wollstonecraft's complaint that the 
inferior status of women oficn compels them to cat 
'the bitter bread of dependence' ( 1985: 158). 
The law only ensures the citizen's freedom, how-
ever, when it is responsive to the citizenry and 
when the republic itself is secure and stable enough 
for its laws to be effective. Sustaining freedom 
under the rule of law thus requires not only public-
spiritcd participation in public affairs and a willing-
ness to bear the burdens of a common life - the 
civic virtue of the republican citizen - but also the 
proper form of government. This usually has been 
some version of mixed or halanced government, 
so called because it mixes and balances elements of 
rule by one, by the few, and by the many. As J. G. A. 
Pocock ( 1975) and others have noted, writers from 
Polybius and Cicero to Machiavelli and the 
American Founders celebrated the mixed constitu-
tion for its ability to stave off corruption and 
tyranny [sec further Chapter 26]. Monarchy, aris-
tocracy, and democracy, according to these writers, 
are prone to degenerate into tyranny, oligarchy, and 
mob rule, respectively; but a government that dis-
perses power among the three clements could pre-
vent either the one, the few, or the many from 
pursuing its own interest at the expense of the com-
mon good. With each clement holding enough 
power to check the others. the result should be a 
free, stable, and long-lasting government. To be 
sure, republicans have sometimes struggled to 
reconcile their faith in mixed government with their 
distrust or even hatred of hereditary monarchy and 
aristocracy. But this struggle, as in the case of the 
American Founders, has led to a reinterpretation of 
balanced government as one that relics upon the 
checks and hafanccs of separated powers or func-
tions of government. Whether mixed in the older 
sense or balanced in the newer. though. the point is 
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to resist the corruption of power by preventing its 
concentration. 
If the balanced constitution is the characteristic 
form of the republic, civic virtue is its lifeblood. 
Without citizens who are willing to defend the 
republic against foreign threats and to take an active 
part in government, even the mixed constitution 
will fail. Republics must thus engage in what 
Michael Sandel calls 'a formative politics ... that 
cultivates in citizens the qualities of character that 
self-government requires' (1996: 6). Constitutional 
safeguards may be necessary to resist avarice, 
ambition, luxury, idleness, and other forms of cor-
ruption, but they will not be enough to sustain free-
dom under the rule of law. Replenishing the supply 
of civic virtue through education and other means 
will thus be one of the principal concerns of a 
prudent republic - a concern manifest in the works 
of writers as different in other respects as Aristotle 
and Wollstonecraft. 
A prudent republic will also be a small one. That, 
at least, has been the conclusion - or presumption -
of many republicans throughout the centuries. 'In a 
large republic,' Montesquieu explained in The 
Spirit of the Laws, 'the common good is sacrificed 
to a thousand considerations; it is subordinated to 
except10ns; it depends upon accidents. In a small 
one, the public good is better felt, better known, lies 
nearer to each citizen; abuses are less extensive and 
consequently less protected' (1989: 124 [Book 
VIII, ch. 16]). So widespread was this view in the 
late eighteenth century that the American authors of 
the Federalist found it necessary to point out that 
Montesqmeu had also allowed for the possibility of 
a 'federal' or 'CONFEDERATE' (Federalist 9) 
republic. Even then, the debate over the proposed 
Constitution often turned on the question of 
whether the United States would become a 'federal' 
or a 'compound' republic - that is, a republic com-
prising 13 or more smaller republics - or whether it 
would become a 'consolidated' republic that could 
not long preserve its republican character. 
Some scholars have taken disagreements about 
the proper size of a republic to mark one way in 
which modem republicans have diverged from the 
path of classical republicanism. According to this 
view (Pangle, 1988; Rahe, 1992; Zuckert, 1994), 
the truly classical republicans of ancient Greece 
saw civic virtue as desirable because it protected 
and preserved the polis in which the highest virtues 
could be cultivated: 'Wherever the genuine classi-
cal republican tradit10n still lives, there is some kind 
of agreement as to the supreme value of the intel-
lectual virtues, and of a life spent in leisured medi-
tation on the nature of justice, the soul, and divinity' 
(Pangle, 1988: 61). By contrast, modern republi-
cans, who stem from Machiavelli, are willing to 
accept representative government and large polities 
because of their conception of virtue, which allows 
for commerce and acquisitiveness, and their concern 
for natural rights [see also Chapters 3 and 26]. 
Other scholars are more impressed by the conti-
nuity of the republican tradition. Some of these, 
such as Pocock (1975), trace the line of develop-
ment from the 'Atlantic republicans' of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries back through 
Machiavelli to Polybius and Aristotle, while 
Quentin Skinner ( 1998) and others hold that 
modem republicanism derives primarily from Roman 
theory and practice (see e.g. Sellers, 1998). Those 
who look back to Aristotle tend to stress the side of 
republicanism that calls for a life of public-spirited 
political participation; those who look to Rome 
stress the republican commitment to independence 
as freedom under the law. (See Honohan, 2002, for 
an analysis that stresses the distinction between 
participatory and rule-of-law republicanism.) In 
neither case, however, is there an attempt to draw a 
sharp or significant distinction between classical 
and modem republicanism. To the contrary, these 
scholars take the historical consciousness of 
modem republicans - a consciousness reflected 
in their tendency to look to the ancient world for 
exemplars - as evidence of the continuity of the 
classical republican tradition. 
Whether the camp that insists on distinguishing 
modem from classical republicanism or the camp 
that resists that distinction is right is, of course, a 
contested matter. But there is no doubt that it is the 
latter group that is largely responsible for the repub-
lican revival of recent years. Before turning to that 
revival, however, we should step back for a brief 
survey of communitarian ism, with special attention 
to the liberal-communitarian debate [see further 
Chapters 8 and 30]. 
COMMUNITARIAN ISM 
Longing for community is no doubt to be found in 
political thought at least as far back as the republi-
can concern for publicity and self-government. But 
that longing did not find expression in the word 
'communitarian' until the 1840s, when it and com-
munautaire appeared almost simultaneously in the 
writings of English and French socialists [see 
further Chapters 28 and 29]. French dictionaries point 
to Etienne Cabet and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon as the 
first to use communautaire, but the Oxford English 
Dictionary gives the credit for 'communitarian' to 
one Goodwyn Barmby, who founded the Universal 
Communitarian Association in 1841 and edited 
a magazine he called The Promethean, or Com-
munitarian Apostle. According to Ralph Waldo 
Emerson's essay on 'English reformers', Barmby 
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advertised his publication as 'the cheapest of all 
magazines, and the paper most devoted of any to 
the cause of the people; consecrated to Pantheism in 
Religion, and Communism in Politics' (1842: 239). 
In the beginning, then, 'communitarian' seems to 
have been a rough synonym of' socialist' and 'com-
munist'. While those words gradually acquired a 
more precise sense in the ideological battles of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 'communitar-
ian', when it was used at all, remained a vague, gen-
eral term. To be a communitarian was simply to 
believe that community is somehow vital to a 
worthwhile life and is therefore to be protected 
against various threats. Socialists and communists 
were leftists, but a communitarian could as easily 
be to the right as the left of centre politically 
(Miller, 2000c) [see further Chapter 1 OJ. 
Communitarianism in this sense began to take 
shape as a self-conscious way of thinking about 
society and politics in the late nineteenth century 
[see Chapters 28 and 29]. According to one line of 
thought that developed at the time, the primary 
threat to community is the centrifugal force of 
modem life. That is, people who moved from the set-
tled, family-focused life of villages and small towns 
to the unsettled, individualistic life of commerce 
and cities might gain affluence and personal free-
dom, but they paid the price of alienation, isolation, 
and rootlessness. Ferdinand Ti.innies (2001), with 
his distinction between Gemeinschafi (community) 
and Gesellschafi (association or civil society), has 
been especially influential in this regard. As 
Tiinnies defines the terms, Gemeinschafi is an inti-
mate, organic, and traditional form of human asso-
ciation; Gesellschafi is impersonal, mechanical, and 
rational. To exchange the former for the latter, then, 
is to trade wannth and support for coldness and 
calculation. 
Concern for community took another direction in 
the twentieth century as some writers began to see 
the centripetal force of the modem state as the princi-
pal threat to community. This tum is evident, for 
instance, in Jose Ortega y Gasset's warnings in The 
Revolt of the Masses against 'the gravest danger 
that today threatens civilisation: State intervention; 
the absorption of all spontaneous social effort by 
the State' (1932: 120). Robert Nisbet's The Quest 
for Community (1953) provides an especially clear 
statement of this position, which draws more on 
Tocqueville's insistence on the importance of 
voluntary associations of citizens than on a longing for 
Gemeinschaft. Community, on Nisbet's account, is 
a form of association in which people more or less 
spontaneously work together to solve common 
problems and live under codes of authority they 
have generated themselves. But the free and healthy 
life of community is increasingly difficult to sus-
tain, he argues, in the face of constant pressure from 
the modem state, with its impulses toward centralized 
power and bureaucratic regulation. 
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in 
short, the longing for community took the form of a 
reaction against both the atomizing, anomic tenden-
cies of modem, urban society and the use of the 
centripetal force of the modem state to check these 
tendencies. Moreover, modernity was often linked 
with liberalism, a theory that many took to rest on 
and encourage atomistic and even 'possessive' indi-
vidualism (Macpherson, 1962). Against this back-
ground, communitariani.1m developed in the late 
twentieth century in the course of a debate with - or 
perhaps within - liberalism. This debate occasion-
ally took an overtly political form as various politi-
cal figures insisted on the need to defend 
community standards and cohesion against the 
onslaught of relentless individualism. Most 
notably, Bill Clinton in the United States and Tony 
Blair in Britain appealed to communitarian con-
cerns as they advocated policies meant to give 
as much weight to individual responsibilities as 
to individual rights. The terms of the libcral-
communitarian debate, however, were set not so 
much by politicians as by political philosophers. 
Four books published in rapid succession in the 
1980s - Alasdair Maclntyrc's Afier Virtue (1981), 
Michael Sandel's Liheralism and the Limits uf 
Justice ( 1982), Michael Walzcr's Spheres ofJustice 
(1983), and Charles Taylor's Philosophical Papers 
(I 985) - marked the emergence of this philoso-
phical form of communitarianism. 7 Different as they 
are from one another, all of these books express dis-
satisfaction with liberalism, especially in the form 
of theories of justice and rights. The main target 
here was John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971 ), 
but Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia 
(1974), Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriouslv 
( 1977), and Bruce Ackerman's Social Justice in the 
Liheral State ( 1980) also came in for criticism. A 
typical complaint was, and is, that these theories arc 
too abstract and universalistic. In opposing them, 
Walzer proposes a 'radically particularist' approach 
that attends to 'history, culture, and membership' 
by asking not what 'rational individuals ... under 
universalizing conditions of such-and-such a sort' 
would choose, but what would 'individuals like us 
choose, who arc situated as we arc, who share a 
culture and arc determined to go on sharing it?' 
(1983: xiv, 5). Walzer thus calls attention to the 
importance of community, which he and others 
writing in the early 1980s took to be suffering from 
both philosophical and political neglect. 
Nor do Walzer and the others who came to be 
known as 'communitarians' believe that theoretical 
indifference has merely coincided with the erosion 
of community that they sec in the world around 
them. In various ways Walzer, Macintyre, Sandel, 
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and Taylor, among others, have all charged that the 
liberal emphasis on distributive justice and indivi-
dual rights works to divide the citizens of the modern 
state against one another, thereby fostering isola-
tion, alienation, and apathy rather than commitment 
to a common civic enterprise. Liberals responded, 
of course, and the liberal-communitarian debate 
was on. 
Those enlisted on the communitarian side of the 
debate have pressed four major objections against 
their 'liberal' or 'individualist' opponents. The first 
1s the complaint, already noted in Walzer, that 
abstract reason will not bear the weight philosophers 
have placed on it in their attempts to ground justice 
and morality. This 'Enlightenment project' 
(Macintyre, 1981) is doomed by its failure to recog-
mze that reasoning about these matters cannot pro-
ceed apart from shared traditions and practices, each 
with its own set of roles, responsibilities, and 
virtues. Second, the liberal emphasis on individual 
rights and Justice comes at the expense of civic duty 
and the common good. In Sandel's words, 'justice 
finds its limits in those forms of community that 
engage the identity as well as the interests of the 
participants .... [T]o some I owe more than justice 
requires or even permits ... in virtue of those more 
or less enduring attachments and commitments 
which taken together partly define the person I am' 
( 1982: 179, 182). Contemporary liberals are blind to 
these enduring attachments and commitments, 
according to the third charge, because they too often 
rely on an atomistic conception of the self - an 
'unencumbered self', in Sandel' s terms - that is sup-
posedly prior to its ends and attachments. Such a 
conception 1s both false and pernicious, for individ-
ual selves are largely constituted by the communities 
that nurture and sustain them. When Rawls and other 
'deontolog1cal liberals' teach individuals to think of 
themselves as somehow prior to and apart from these 
communities, they are engaged quite literally in a 
self-defeating enterprise. The fourth objection, then, 
is that these abstract and universalistic theories of 
justice and rights have contributed to the withdrawal 
into private life and the intransigent insistence on 
one's rights against others that threaten modern 
societies. There is little sense of a common good or 
even a common ground on which citizens can meet. 
In Maclntyre's words, the conflict between the advo-
cates of mcommensurablc moral positions has so 
riven modern societies that politics now 'is civil war 
carried on by other means' (1981: 253). The best we 
can do in these circumstances is to agree to disagree 
while we try to fashion 'local forms of community 
withm which civility and the intellectual and moral 
life can be sustained through the new dark ages 
which are already upon us' (1981: 263). 
The communitarians have not all pressed all of 
these objections with equal force, nor have they all 
understood themselves to be criticizing liberalism 
from the outside. Taylor (1989), for instance, has 
argued that reasonable liberals and communitarians 
share a commitment to 'holist individualism' - a 
view that rejects ontological atomism and affirms 
that individuals are somehow socially constituted, 
on the one hand, yet also recognizes, on the other, 
the importance of individual rights and liberties. 
Other theorists with communitarian leanings con-
tinue to regard themselves as liberals (Galston, 
1991; Spragens, 1995). From their point of view the 
fundamental worry is that other liberals are so pre-
occupied with the rights and liberties of the abstract 
individual that they put the survival of liberal soci-
eties at risk. Whether this worry is well founded is 
a question that the 'liberal' side of the debate has 
raised in response to the 'communitarians'. (For a 
valuable, full-length survey of this debate, see 
Mulhall and Swift, 1996.) 
Here we may distinguish three interlocking 
responses. The first is that the communitarians' crit-
icisms are misplaced because they have miscon-
ceived liberalism (Caney, 1992). In particular, the 
communitarians have misunderstood the abstract-
ness of the theories they criticize. Thus Rawls main-
tains (l 993: Lecture I) that his 'political' 
conception of the self as prior to its ends is not a 
metaphysical claim about the nature of the self, as 
Sandel believes, but simply a way of representing 
the parties who are choosing principles of justice 
from behind the 'veil of ignorance'. Nor does this 
conception of the individual as a self capable of 
choosing its ends require liberals to deny that indi-
vidual identity is in many ways the product of 
unchosen attachments and social circumstances. 
'What is central to the liberal view,' according to 
Will Kymlicka, 'is not that we can perceive a self 
prior to its ends, but that we understand ourselves to 
be prior to our ends, in the sense that no end or goal 
is exempt from possible re-examination' (1989: 52, 
emphasis in original). With this understood, a 
second response is to grant, as Kymlicka, Dworkin 
(1986; 1992), Gewirth (1996), and Mason (2000) 
do, that liberals should pay more attention to 
belonging, identity, and community, but to insist 
that they can do this perfectly well within their 
existing theories. The third response, finally, is to 
point to the dangers of the critics' appeal to com-
munity norms. Communities have their virtues, but 
they have their vices, too - smugness, intolerance, 
and various forms of oppression and exploitation 
among them. The fact that communitarians do not 
embrace these vices simply reveals the perversity of 
their criticism: they 'want us to live in Salem, but 
not to believe in witches' (Gutmann, 1992: 133; 
Friedman, 1992). If liberals rely on abstractions and 
universal considerations in their theories of justice 
and rights, that is because they must do so to rise 
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above - and critically assess - local prejudices that 
communitarians must simply accept. 
Communitarian rejoinders have indicated their 
sensitivity to this last point. Sandel, as we shall see, 
has decided that 'republican' better defines his 
position than 'communitarian', and Macintyre has 
denied, quite forcefully, that he is or ever was a 
communitarian.8 Others have embraced the com-
munitarian label, but their rejoinders to 'liberal' 
criticisms stress their desire to strike a balance 
between individual rights and civic responsibilities 
(Etzioni, 1996) in order to 'move closer to the ideal 
of community life' - a life in which 'we learn the 
value of integrating what we seek individually with 
the needs and aspirations of other people' (Tam, 
1998: 220, emphasis added). In contrast to 
Macintyre, Sandel, Walzer, and Taylor, these 
'political communitarians' (Frazer, 1999) are less 
concerned with philosophical criticism of liberal-
ism or individualism than with moving closer to the 
ideal of community life by reviving civil society. 
They hope to do this, in particular, by calling atten-
tion to shared values and beliefs, encouraging 
active and widespread participation in civic life, 
and bringing politics down to the local, properly 
'human' level (Frazer, 1999: 41-2). 
The key question for these 'political' communi-
tarians is whether 'the ideal of community life' is 
precise and powerful enough to do the work they 
want it to do. To the 'political' communitarian, 
appealing to the 'spirit' of community holds the 
promise of uniting people of various political incli-
nations - left, right, and centre. To others, however, 
it seems that 'the communitarian political move-
ment, avoiding controversial political issues in 
order to appeal to as wide a range of constituents as 
possible, ends up as little more than a moral appeal 
to us all to behave better: take more responsibility 
for our social environment, avoid corruption, etc., 
etc.' (Miller, 2000c: 109). Communitarianism of 
this sort may be useful as exhortation, but it is too 
vague and accommodating to succeed as a political 
philosophy. 
REPUBLICANISM REVIVED 
Whether 'philosophical' or 'political', communitar-
ianism is too vague to be helpful and too accom-
modating to be acceptable. Communities take a 
great many forms, including some - such as fascist 
or Nazi communes - that communitarians them-
selves must find unpalatable or intolerable. Sandel 
acknowledges the point when he says, in his review 
of Rawls's Political Liberalism, that the 'term 
"communitarianism" is misleading ... insofar as 
it implies that rights should rest on the values or 
preferences that prevail in any given community at 
any given time' ( 1994: 1767). He has, accordingly, 
abandoned this misleading term in favour of 
'republicanism'. He persists in his criticism of lib-
eralism, to be sure, but he apparently believes that 
he is in a better position to criticize as a republican 
committed to 'a fonnativc politics ... that cultivates 
in citizens the qualities of character self-government 
requires' (1996: 6) than as a communitarian com-
mitted to the prevailing values and preferences in a 
given community at a given time. What counts for 
the republican is not community per se, but the com-
munity of self-governing, public-spirited citizens. 
Sandcl's profession of republicanism has con-
tributed to a revival of republican political theory 
that has been under way since at least 1975, when 
Pocock's Machiavellian Moment called attention to 
the 'Atlantic republican tradition'. Pocock himself 
drew on the work of other historians, such as Zera 
Fink (1945), Caroline Robbins (1959), Bernard 
Bailyn (1967), and Gordon Wood (1969), who had 
stressed the importance of republican or 'common-
wealth' themes in the political controversies and 
upheavals of England and America in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries [sec further 
Chapter 26]. Another source of inspiration was the 
political theorist Hannah Arendt: 'Jn terms bor-
rowed from or suggested by the language of 
Hannah Arendt, [The Machiavellian Moment] has 
told part of the story of the revival in the early mod-
ern West of the ancient ideal of homo politicus (the 
zom1 politikon of Aristotle), who affirms his being 
and his virtue by the medium of political action' 
(1975: 550) [sec further Chapter 23]. 
It would be unwise to say that a thinker as multi-
farious as Arendt was first, last, and above all a 
republican, but there is certainly a strong streak of 
republicanism in her writings (Canovan, 1992, esp. 
ch. 6). This streak is most evident in her recurring 
concern for what I have called the cornerstones of 
republicanism - publicity and self-government. To 
some commentators this concern seems little more 
than misplaced nostalgia for the ancient polis (e.g. 
O'Sullivan, 1975). But Arcndt's complaint is not so 
much that civic life in modern democracies has 
declined dramatically from some golden age, as 
that it has failed to realize the promise of republican 
citizenship. Technology has cased the burdens of 
labour and freed us to act as citizens in the public 
realm, she argued in The Human Condition (1958), 
yet we forsake public life in favour of private con-
sumption. We want government to provide for the 
welfare of the citizenry, she declared in 011 
Rernlution, but we 'deny the very existence of 
public happiness and public freedom' as we 'insist 
that politics is a burden' (1965: 273). We arc. in 
short. squandering an opportunity to achieve what 
the republicans of ancient Greece and Rome 
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thought to be impossible - a polity in which the 
freedom of republican self-government is available 
not only to the well-to-do few but to almost the 
entire people. 
Similar worries about 'the erosion of the distinc-
tively political' animated Sheldon Wolin's influen-
tial Politics and Vision ( 1960: 290). Like Arendt, 
Wolin's complaint is that 'the political' has been 
displaced by 'the social' in the modem world. What 
we call 'politics' is little more than the squabbling 
of groups seeking to protect and promote their inter-
ests, with devastating consequences for civic life. 
'There is substantial evidence,' Wolin remarks, that 
participation in public affairs is regarded with indiffer-
ence by vast numbers of members. The average citizen 
seems to find the exercise of political rights burden-
some, boring, and often lacking in significance. To be a 
citizen does not appear an important role nor political 
participation an intrinsic good ... By reducing citizen-
ship to a cheap commodity, democracy has seemingly 
contributed to the dilution of politics. (1960: 353) 
In retrospect, then, Pocock's Machiavellian 
Moment appears to have brought together and sup-
plied a name for two previously distinct bodies of 
scholarship: the efforts of historians to recover a 
form of political thought that seemed to be all but 
lost; and the efforts of political theorists, notably 
Arendt and Wolin, to remind their contemporaries 
of the value of the public life of the self-governing 
citizen. Those scholars who have subsequently seen 
themselves as engaged in the republican revival 
have tried, for the most part, to combine these tasks 
by dedicating themselves to the historical retrieval 
and reconstruction of republicanism (e.g. Sullivan, 
1986; Boyte, 1989; Oldfield, 1990). So much is 
necessary, it seems, if they are to show that the 
republican concepts and idioms of earlier eras still 
speak to present concerns. Thus Sandel tries in 
Democracy s Discontent to devise a 'public philo-
sophy' for the United States by reclaiming the 
republicanism of the American Founding and the 
'political economy of citizenship' that governed 
American thinking about economic relationships, 
he argues, into the late nineteenth century. 
But that is not to say that neorepublican theorists 
have shied away from prescription as they have 
explored the implications of republicanism for con-
temporary politics. To the contrary, their recom-
mendations range from the specific - national or 
civic service programmes (Barber, 1984: 298-303), 
campaign finance reform (Sunstein, 1988: 1576--8), 
and compulsory voting (Dagger, 1997: 145-51), for 
example - to such general issues as national identity 
(Miller, 1995), economic arrangements that foster 
citizenship and strong communities (Sandel, 1996: 
Part II; Sullivan, 1986; ch. 7), and the justification of 
punishment (Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990). They are 
not so united on any of these points as to warrant the 
claim that there is a neorepublican programme for 
political change, but it is possible to discern four 
broad themes on which they do agree. These are the 
interrelated themes of political equality, freedom as 
self-government, deliberative politics, and civic 
virtue (cf. Sunstein, 1988: 1548). 
The commitment to equality is hardly distinctive 
of neorepublicanism, for it is a commitment shared, 
if Dworkin (1977: 179-83) and Kymlicka (1990: 
4-5 and passim) are correct, by every plausible 
political theory. It does distinguish them, of course, 
from their classical forebears, whose praise of the 
equal rule (isonomia) of citizens sometimes went 
hand-in-hand with a defence of slavery. What 
makes the neorepublican position truly distinctive, 
however, is the combination of a belief in the equal 
moral worth of persons with the traditional republi-
can emphasis on the importance of political equality. 
Everyone, that is, should have the opportunity to 
become a citizen, and every citizen should stand on 
an equal footing, under law and in the political 
arena, with every other citizen. Republicanism may 
thus require steps to be taken to relieve women 
from subjection to men, workers from subjection to 
employers, and the members of some racial, ethnic, 
or cultural groups from subjection to others. In the 
traditional idiom, these steps may be necessary to 
free some people from dependence on others. They 
may also require some redistribution of wealth and 
limits on the use of money to obtain or exercise 
political influence. Even so, neorepublicans typi-
cally take the Aristotelian view of property- private 
ownership for the public good - and see no point in 
'material egalitarianism' for its own sake (Pettit, 
1997: 161). 
The connection of political equality to the second 
theme, freedom as self-government, is a close one. 
Both involve what Philip Pettit calls 'the frankness 
ofintersubjective equality' (1997: 64). On the repub-
lican view, as we have seen, freedom is not so much 
a matter of being left alone as it is of living under 
the rule of laws that one has a voice in making. 
Republicans differ from liberals in this regard, 
according to Pettit, because 'the supreme political 
value' (1997: 80) of republicanism is freedom 
understood not as non-interference - the liberal 
view - but as non-domination or, in Skinner's 
terms, 'absence of dependence' (2002: 18). It is not 
interference as such that is objectionable, on this 
view, but its arbitrariness. The slave and the citizen 
may both suffer interference when one must bow to 
the will of the master and the other must bow to the 
law, but it is a mistake to say that they both suffer 
the loss of freedom. The master need not be con-
cerned for the slave's desires or interests, but the 
Jaw, at least in the ideal, must attend to the interests 
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of the citizen qua citizen even when it interferes 
with his or her activities. By protecting the citizen 
against arbitrary power, the law is 'the non-mastering 
interferer' (Pettit, 1997: 41) that ensures the 
citizen's freedom. So valuable is this independence 
from arbitrary power, Pettit insists, that it is a 'pri-
mary good' in the Rawlsian sense. Whatever else 
people may want, they will want to be free from 
domination because they then will have the ability 
to make plans, to speak with independent voices, 
and simply to be persons: 'everyone - or at least 
everyone who has to make his or her way in a 
pluralistic society - will want to be treated properly 
as a person, as a voice that cannot be generally 
ignored' (1997: 91). 
Republican political institutions, then, must 
ensure the political equality of self-governing 
citizens. To this end, neorepublicans call for a more 
deliberative form of politics [see further Chapters 1 I 
and 12]. As Cass Sunstein puts it, 'republicans will 
attempt to design political institutions that promote 
discussion and debate among the citizenry; they 
will be hostile to systems that promote lawmaking 
as "deals" or bargains among self-interested private 
groups' (1988: 1549). This is not to say that repub-
licans believe that citizens would easily or quickly 
come to agreement about what the common good 
requires if only government could be freed from the 
stranglehold of interest groups. The point, instead, 
is that reviving the republican conception of politics 
as the public business means rejecting the 'eco-
nomic model' of politics, according to which indivi-
duals and groups bring their preferences, already 
fixed, to the political marketplace, where they use 
their political capital and bargaining power to strike 
the best deals for themselves. On the republican 
view, politics of this sort is a form of corruption 
that reduces the citizen to a consumer seeking to 
promote his or her personal interests. Steps must be 
taken, then, to limit the power of private interests, 
to prepare people through civic education to take 
the part of the public-spirited citizen, and to provide 
them with arenas or forums in which they may 
engage in debate and deliberation on the public 
business. 
Deliberative politics will succeed, however, only 
if there is a sufficient supply of civic virtue; other-
wise debate and deliberation will be little more than 
a vain display that distracts attention from the 'real' 
politics of bargaining for personal advantage. This 
is the fourth theme of the neorepublicans: civic 
virtue is necessary if self-government is to be sus-
tained. But the neorepublicans also tend to believe 
that civic virtue is either in decline or in jeopardy, 
and they frequently place the blame on liberalism. 
As Sandel says, 'the civic or fonnativc aspect of 
our [American] politics has largely given way to 
the liberalism that conceives persons as free and 
independent selves, unencumbered by moral or 
civic tics they have not chosen' ( 1996: 6 ). This 
'voluntarist' or 'procedural' liberalism, as found in 
the works of liberal philosophers such as Rawls and 
the decisions oflibcral jurists, has fostered a society 
in which individuals fail to understand how much 
they owe to the community. The chief purpose of 
the state is thus taken to be the arbitration of con-
flicting claims of individuals in pursuit of their dis-
parate conceptions of the good life. Such a society 
will be self-subverting, Sandel insists, for it 'fails to 
capture those loyalties and responsibilities whose 
moral force consists partly in the fact that living by 
them is inseparable from understanding ourselves 
as the particular persons we arc - as members of 
this family or city or nation or people, as bearers of 
that history, as citizens of this republic' (I 996: I 4 ). 
Where such loyalties and responsibilities cannot be 
sustained, self-government cannot survive. Hence 
the need for a republican revival. 
Taken together, these four themes suggest that 
republicans today have a powerful and coherent 
political theory - more powerful and coherent, in 
my view, than communitarianism. But there is a 
fifth theme running through the writings of the new 
republicans, and on this point they seem to divide. 
This theme is the relationship of republicanism to 
liberalism. In general, neorepublicans share the 
communitarian conviction that many liberals give 
too much attention to individual rights and too little 
to civic duties. This is particularly true, they hold, 
of libertarians and those who maintain that liberal-
ism must be strictly neutral with regard to compet-
ing conceptions of the good [sec further Chapter 9]. 
In response, some scholars with republican sympa-
thies see a need to recall the 'civic' or 'republican' 
elements in liberalism (e.g. Holmes, 1995; Terchck, 
1997; Spragens, I 999) or otherwise argue for the 
adoption of republican liberalism or liberal republi-
canism (Sunstein, I 988; Burtt, I 993; Dagger, 
1997). But others insist, with Pettit and Sandel, that 
republicanism is different enough from liberalism 
to justify thinking of them as rival theories. By 
doing so, however, they open themselves to the 
objection that Sandel has brought against those 
liberals who have embraced the ideals of political 
neutrality and the unencumbered self: that they arc 
engaged in a self-subverting enterprise. Just as a 
liberal society must be able to count on a sense of 
community and civic engagement, so a republican 
polity must be able to count on a commitment to 
principles generally associated with liberalism, 
such as tolerance, fair play, and respect for the 
rights of others. If their zeal for individual rights 
and liberty sometimes leads liberals to undercut 
their position by threatening the communal or 
republican underpinnings of a liberal society, so 
Pettit, Sandel, and others who oppose republicanism 
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to liberalism are in danger of undercutting their 
position by threatening the liberal principles upon 
which they implicitly rely. (See Dagger, 1999 and 
2000, for elaboration of this criticism of Sandel and 
Pettit, respectively.) 
CONCLUSION 
Two conclusions follow from this survey of com-
munitarianism and republicanism. One is that 
republicanism is superior to communitarianism; 
the other is that neither historical considerations 
(Banning, 1986; Isaac, 1988) nor theoretical 
prudence warrant a sharp distinction between republi-
canism and liberalism. In developing their theory, 
though, neorepublicans continue to face difficulties 
and challenges - two of which I shall briefly discuss 
by way of conclusion. 
The first challenge is to respond to those who 
hold that neorepublicans can never escape the 
biases implicit in the traditional republican ideal of 
the citizen as a property-owning, arms-bearing man. 
This objection is put forcefully by Iris Marion 
Young, who detects a denial of 'difference' in 
republican attempts to establish a 'civic public' in 
which citizens devote themselves to the common 
good. 'This ideal of the civic public,' Young 
charges, 'excludes women and other groups defined 
as different, because its rational and universal status 
derives only from its opposition to affectivity, 
particularity, and the body' (1990: 117). 
The second challenge is to demonstrate the rele-
vance of republicanism in an age of globalization. 
In the face of the rapid spread of global communi-
cations, the rise of the global economy, and threats 
to the environment that respect no boundaries, 
political theorists must think in cosmopolitan terms. 
To a critical eye, however, republicanism may seem 
to be a nostalgic form of political thinking that is so 
fixed on the small-scale polities of years long past -
on the Italian city-states, the Roman civitas, and the 
Greek polis - as to be incapable of responding to 
the challenges of globalization. 
These are challenges that republicans must take 
seriously. Indeed, they are taking them seriously, as 
recent republican or 'civic liberal' responses to the 
challenges of 'difference' and of globalism indi-
cate.9 These responses engage the four themes mcn-
t10ned above, and they rely ultimately on the 
republican commitment to publicity and self-
govemment - a commitment that cannot be met if 
too much is conceded to either the politics of dif-
ference or cosmopolitanism. There will be disagree-
ment, no doubt, as to the adequacy of these responses. 
There should be no doubt, however, that neorepub-
hcans are capable of responding to challenges that 
their classical forebears neither faced nor anticipated. 
That their theory contains such resources is, in the 
end, the best testimony to the importance of reviv-
ing republicanism. 
NOTES 
I am grateful to Terence Ball, Iseult Honohan, and David 
Miller for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this 
chapter. 
1 The website of the Australian Republican Movement 
quotes a dictionary definition of a republic as a system in 
which the people elect representatives, then adds this 
statement: 'In particular, a republic refers to a system of 
government that has no hereditary monarch - a person 
who holds political or constitutional office purely as a 
birthright' (www.rcpublic.org.au, 18 July 2002). 
2 Even Sudhir Hazareesingh, who identifies the leading 
characteristics of French republicanism as '[p ]articipa-
tionism, perfectionism, universalism, nationalism, and 
revolutionism' (1994: 68-9), assumes that opposition to 
monarchy is a defining feature of republicanism: 'None of 
the central figures of the revolution was a self-confessed 
republican, and France was declared a Republic only in 
September 1792, after the experiment of a constitutional 
monarchy had been deemed a failure. The proclamation of 
the Republic was itself accelerated by popular pressure, 
emanating particularly from such grass-roots organi-
zations as the anti-monarchical clubs de quartiers' 
( 1994: 69). 
3 Cf. Everdell in a book entitled The End ofKings: 'The 
essential republican principle is that no one person shall 
rule the community, that everyone shall have a part in the 
public's business' (!983: 297). 
4 Cicero again is apposite: 'a public is not every kind of 
human gathering, congregating in any manner, but a 
numerous gathering brought together by legal consent and 
community of interest' (l 998: 19 (Book I, 39]). See also 
Book III, 45 (l 998: 73): 'there is no public except when it 
is held together by a legal agreement'; and for analysis and 
assessment, see Schofield ( 1995). 
5 Historians (Wirszubski, 1960: 9; Skinner, 1998: 45) 
trace this formula to the Roman writers Sallust, Livy, and 
Cicero. 
6 Note also the challenge Rousseau sets himself in the 
Social Contract: 'Find a form of association that defends 
and protects the person and goods of each associate with 
all the common force, and by means of which each one, 
uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and 
remains as free as before' (1978: 53 [Book I, ch. 6]). 
7 A fifth book, Bellah et al. ( 1985), invoked communi-
tarian themes in the course of a sociological analysis of the 
American middle class. 
8 Note Bell (1993: 4 and n. 14) on the reluctance of 
Macintyre, Walzer, Taylor, and Sandel to admit to being 
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communitarians. See also Macintyre: 'Contemporary 
communitarians, from whom I have strongly dissociated 
myself whenever I have had an opportunity to do so, 
advance their proposals as a contribution to the politics of 
the nation-state' (1994: 302); 'Liberals ... mistakenly sup-
pose that those [totalitarian and other] evils arise from any 
form of political community which embodies substantive 
practical agreement upon some strong conception of the 
human good. I by contrast take them to arise from the 
specific character of the nation-state, thus agreeing with 
liberals in this at least, that modem nation-states which 
masquerade as embodiments of community are always to 
be resisted' (1994: 303); 'In any case the liberal critique 
of those nation-states which pretend to embody the values 
of community has little to say to those Aristotelians, such 
as myself, for whom the nation-state is not and cannot be 
the locus of community' ( 1994: 303). See further 
Macintyre (1998: 243-50). 
9 For responses to 'difference', see Dagger ( 1997: 
176-81), Spragens (1999: ch. 4), and Miller (2000b). For 
responses to the global or cosmopolitan challenge, sec 
Sandel (1996: 338-51), Miller (2000a), and Dagger (2001 ). 
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